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CROSS-EXAMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
By 
Jonathan R. Vaitl* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Cross-examination in International Arbitration is written by Kaj Hobér and 
Howard S. Sussman.1 The authors sought to provide lawyers with a fundamental 
understanding of the basic principles of cross-examination in international arbitration. 
The authors begin by distinguishing cross-examination in international arbitration from 
cross-examination in domestic arbitrations and trials. Thereafter, the authors explore nine 
basic principles of cross-examination that lawyers can build upon through experience.2 
Although the authors explain the nine basic principles in detail, they also illustrate the 
principles with actual and hypothetical cross-examination exchanges.3 The authors note 
that the examples are not meant to illustrate a perfect cross-examination, but to offer 
“insights and clues into what works, what doesn’t, and why.”4 Ultimately, cross-
examination is a circumstantial skill – not a script to follow at all times, but a skill 
developed and dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of a case.5 The 
authors provide a starting point and a way of thinking about cross-examination from a 
strategic point of view.6 
The book is a useful guide for practicing attorneys or even law students who 
desire to learn more about cross-examination, both generally and in the context of 
international arbitration. The examples, both real and hypothetical, effectively 
contextualize the principles and allow readers to visualize themselves in the role of the 
cross-examiner, which is itself a valuable practice. The authors walk readers through each 
                                                
* Jonathan R. Vaitl is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2017 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 KAJ HOBÉR & HOWARD S. SUSSMAN, CROSS-EXAMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014).  Kaj 
Hobér is on the Board of Directors of the American Arbitration Association and is a former professor of 
East European Commercial Law at the University of Uppsala. He is currently an associate member of 3 
Verulam Buildings, a preeminent commercial set of barristers’ chambers in London. In addition, Mr. Hobér 
was published in the 2015 volume of the Yearbook on Arbitration & Mediation and participated as an 
arbitration panelist in the 2015 Yearbook symposium entitled “What’s Left of the Law in the Wake of 
ADR?” See Kaj Hobér, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Future – If Any, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 
58 (2015). Howard S. Sussman is Of Counsel at Wrobel, Schatz & Fox in New York City. He previously 
was a Visiting Scholar in Residence at the University of Stockholm and an Associate Professor of Law at 
the University of Houston. 
2 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at v. 
3 Id. at 4. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 155. 
6 Id. 
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phase of a cross-examination, beginning with how to prepare and develop a theory of the 
case, how to ask relevant questions, and how to maintain control of the witness. By 
providing advice about developing a theory of the case, and even devoting a chapter to 
the importance of maintaining self-control, the authors do more than just discuss cross-
examination; they provide advice for being an effective lawyer. At times, the book 
becomes repetitive, certain subsections appear to have little relation to the chapter in 
which they appear, and some of the separated principles – for instance, using leading 
questions and asking simple questions – could have been collapsed into a single principle 
to avoid redundancy. However, the book does not fail because of these flaws, as I 
perceive them. The authors still pack a significant amount of useful advice into a short 
book, making it well worth the read. 
II.   OVERVIEW 
Cross-examination in International Arbitration is divided into three parts 
addressing three fundamental themes: international arbitration is distinct from traditional 
litigation in common law or civil law countries; cross-examination, at its core, is based on 
controlling the witness; and cross-examination elicits facts to support the attorney’s 
closing argument.7 The book offers a short guide, at only 156 pages, and focuses most of 
the attention on the second theme, control of the witness. 
Part One addresses the first theme – a description of arbitration and its differences 
from litigation – in five chapters. Chapter One provides a brief introduction that sets 
down the rationale for the book, namely, that the attorney’s goal is to win the case for his 
or her client, and cross-examination is merely a tool for achieving that goal.8 Chapter 
Two aims to describe the legal nature of international arbitration, including the doctrine 
of separability, compétence de la compétence,9 and arbitral awards and their 
enforceability.10 Beginning with Chapter Three, the authors describe the stages of a 
typical arbitral proceeding and the types of permissible evidence.11 Chapter Four 
addresses general considerations for cross-examination in international arbitration, 
including the multiculturalism inherent to international arbitration.12 Finally in Chapter 
                                                
7 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 155-56. 
8 Id. 4. 
9 Although Hobér and Sussman use the phrase “compétence de la compétence,” as it is known in France, 
the concept does not differ from the German kompetenz-kompetenz, which is the more commonly used 
form. See Natasha Wyss, Comment, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72 TULANE L. REV. 352, 352 (1997). 
10 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 6-13. 
11 Id. at 14-28. 
12 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 29-31. 
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Five, the authors preview the fundamentals of cross-examination that they explore more 
fully in Part Two.13 
Part Two lays out the nine basic principles of cross-examination in international 
arbitration. Chapter Six advises attorneys to be fully prepared to cross-examine a witness, 
which starts with attorneys knowing exactly what they want from the witness.14 In 
Chapter Seven, the authors explain the importance of brevity and keeping cross-
examination to a maximum of three points.15 Chapter Eight highlights the value of 
leading questions,16 and Chapter Nine recommends short, clear, and simple questions.17 
In Chapter Ten, the authors exhort readers to listen carefully to a witness’s answers to 
determine a witness’s motivation for evading the question.18 Chapter Eleven cautions 
attorneys not to ask witnesses to agree with conclusions.19 In Chapter Twelve, the authors 
further warn readers not to let witnesses repeat their prior direct testimony,20 and Chapter 
Thirteen states that the cross-examiner should not let the witness explain an answer 
because doing so runs the risk of the witness saying something damaging to the 
attorney’s client.21 Finally in Chapter Fourteen, the authors counsel readers to maintain 
self-control in order to maintain control over the witness.22 
Part Three offers the authors’ concluding words in which they underscore the 
value of experience in developing the skill of cross-examination.23 In this part, the 
authors identify the three underlying themes to the book.24 
                                                
13 Id. at 32-45. 
14 Id. at 49-65. 
15 Id. at 66-77. 
16 Id. at 78-86. 
17 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 87-103. 
18 Id. at 104-14. 
19 Id. at 115-25. 
20 Id. at 126-36. 
21 Id. at 137-45. 
22 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 146-52. 
23 Id. at 155. 
24 Id. at 155-56. 
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III.   PART I – BACKGROUND  
A.  The Law Surrounding International Arbitration 
The authors start Part One by discussing the law of international arbitration.  
Arbitration is a means of resolving disputes between contracting parties who, through 
their contract, consented to the use of arbitration as an alternative to a judicial 
proceeding.25 The consensual nature of arbitration distinguishes it from judicial 
proceedings, but like a judicial trial, the arbitral proceeding exists because of, and will 
depend on, the law of the nation in which the arbitration takes place.26 However, the 
parties retain significant control over how the arbitration will proceed, including the 
manner of handling evidence and the ability of parties to amend current claims or 
introduce new claims.27 In this sense, the arbitration agreement between the parties, more 
than the national law where the arbitration takes place, governs the proceeding and grants 
authority to the arbitrators to hear the dispute.28 The arbitration agreement, then, also 
serves as a bar to resolving the dispute through litigation unless certain exceptions 
apply.29 
Two key, interrelated doctrines serve as cornerstones of international arbitration: 
the doctrine of separability and compétence de la compétence.30 Under the doctrine of 
separability, an arbitral clause stands as its own, independent contract, and a party who 
can invalidate the main agreement has not necessarily invalidated the arbitral clause.31 
                                                
25 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 6. 
26 Id. at 7. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 7. 
29 Id. at 8-9. One exception is if the subject matter of the arbitration is not arbitrable under the pertinent 
national law. The agreement also will not bar litigation if one of the parties has waived the arbitration 
agreement, for example, by not objecting to the other party pursuing its claim in court, or if the agreement 
itself is not valid as a contract. A final exception concerns the validity of the arbitration agreement under 
contract law. A contractually invalid agreement will not prevent one of the parties from seeking resolution 
through the courts. Id. 
30 Janet A. Rosen, Note, Arbitration Under Private International Law: The Doctrines of Separability and 
Competence de la Competence, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 599, 609 (1994). 
The competence de la competence doctrine is considered a corollary to the separability doctrine. The 
separability doctrine, which espouses the autonomy of the arbitration agreement, creates a need for the 
arbitral tribunal to have the jurisdictional competence to rule not only on the main contract’s validity but 
also on the validity of the arbitration agreement. Under this analysis, the competence of the arbitral tribunal 
to rule on jurisdictional challenges is a corollary to the doctrine of separability establishing the autonomous 
nature of the arbitration agreement. 
Id. 
31 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 9. The authors note that the doctrine of separability is crucial to 
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The principle of compétence de la compétence authorizes arbitrators to determine the 
validity of an arbitration agreement and to determine whether the tribunal has jurisdiction 
to hear the dispute.32 The authors point out that, although arbitration decisions in most 
jurisdictions are binding and final, certain countries allow parties to challenge decisions 
regarding the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.33 
When a tribunal determines the validity of an arbitration agreement and their own 
jurisdiction, the arbitration proceedings may commence, and the arbitrators will render an 
award that is presumed to be final and binding unless the parties state otherwise in the 
agreement.34 An unsatisfied party, however, may challenge the award in court, albeit on 
procedural grounds and not on the merits.35 In some cases, parties can even seek 
nullification of an award.36 Barring any impediments to an international arbitration 
award, the award will be enforceable internationally.37 
B.  How International Arbitration Works 
Arbitration generally follows a series of stages, unless the parties dictate 
otherwise in their agreement.38 First, the party making a claim will initiate arbitration by 
submitting a written request, which includes the party’s appointment of an arbitrator, 
either to the other party to the agreement or to an arbitration institution.39 The other party 
will reply to the request for arbitration and appoint its own arbitrator, at which point the 
                                                                                                                                            
international arbitration because it prevents a party from avoiding arbitration by invalidating the main 
agreement. The same claims that can invalidate a contract, such as coercion, incapacity, or illegality, can 
also invalidate an arbitration agreement. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 10. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. See also Rémy Gerbay, Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of 
International Arbitration, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223 (2014) (stating that an apparent increase in the 
“judicialization” of international arbitration reflects the increasing sophistication and complexity of 
disputes submitted to international arbitration, as compared to the early days of international arbitration). 
36 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 11. Nullification requires the party seeking nullification to prove 
that an arbitration agreement is not valid, the party was not given due notice, the dispute or the arbitrator’s 
decision was not within the scope of the arbitration agreement, or the makeup of the arbitral tribunal did not 
accord with the agreement. A court can also nullify an award if the court finds that the subject matter of the 
dispute was not arbitrable or that the award offends public policy. 
37 Id. at 12. 
38 Id. at 14. See also Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration Is Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile, 2005 
J. DISP. RESOL. 323, 339-40 (2005) (stating that each arbitration institution will have its own procedural 
rules, which are available for download on the institutions’ websites). 
39 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 14. 
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two arbitrators will agree on a third arbitrator to serve as chairperson of the tribunal.40 
Once the parties have selected the arbitrators, the claimant sets forth the issues in dispute 
in its “statement of claim,” and the other party submits a “statement of defense” that will 
also include any counterclaims the party wants to make.41 Both sides then have the option 
of making additional replies and addressing procedural issues.42 The parties will then 
participate in a hearing, introducing testimonial and documentary evidence, as well as 
making their arguments, which may be followed by a post-hearing briefing period.43 At 
the conclusion of all presentation of evidence and argument, the arbitrators will render 
their decision as a written award.44 
 The initial statements submitted by the parties generally contain three parts: (1) 
each party’s prayer for relief, (2) the legal grounds for the claim or defense, and (3) the 
facts and circumstances supporting each party’s claim or defense.45 The prayers for relief 
precisely set forth what the parties want and serve as boundaries on the arbitrators’ 
authority to rule;46 however, the scope of the arbitration agreement restrains the scope of 
the parties’ prayers for relief.47 The legal grounds will relate to both the specific legal 
injury, such as a claim of breach of a specific contract provision, as well as the law 
supporting that claim, such as specific statutes or case law.48 The parties must also state 
the relevant facts with a significant amount of detail so that the arbitrators have a 
complete picture for making an accurate decision.49 If the respondent chooses to make a 
counterclaim, it will generally raise the counterclaim in its statement of defense, but both 
parties often have the ability, unless their agreement forbids it, to augment or amend their 
                                                
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 15. 
42 Id. at 15. Other procedural issues may include “questions relating to jurisdiction, production of 
documents, amendment of claims or presentations of new claims, and the determination of the applicable 
law.” 
43 Id. 
44 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 15-16. The authors point out three ways in which the above 
procedure differs from traditional civil litigation. First, the proceeding usually does not include a discovery 
period before the hearing. The authors caution that the lack of discovery period does not mean that the 
parties do not share a voluminous amount of information, but that it does put the onus on the parties and 
their counsel to conduct their own investigations and resources in developing their cases. Second, the 
authors highlight the absence of evidentiary rules in international arbitration. The result is that most 
evidence will be admitted, “even if the party opposing its admission claims that it is forged or stolen or 
otherwise inauthentic or tainted.” Finally, the arbitrators are not presumed to know the law the way parties 
to litigation would assume the court knows the law. Id. 
45 Id. at 18. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 18. 
48 Id. 
49 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 18. 
  321 
initial claims.50 Not all arbitrations will include post-hearing briefs, stopping instead after 
the conclusion of closing arguments;51 however, parties frequently have a final 
opportunity to present their arguments and facts before the arbitrators make their 
decision.52 
 The hearing itself consists of the parties presenting evidence in the form of 
witness testimony and documents. The way that parties present evidence can vary from 
one arbitration to another, owing to the parties’ ability to control the arbitral 
proceeding.53 Party autonomy for controlling the arbitration ultimately results in the 
arbitrators having limited authority to exclude evidence, unless the evidence is 
“manifestly irrelevant to the dispute or…is not timely presented.”54 Arbitrators typically 
have no subpoena power and do not administer oaths.55 However, despite their 
limitations, arbitrators determine how to weigh the evidence presented, and cross-
examination can serve as a potent way of achieving the truth in the absence of oaths.56 
Arbitrators rely on their right to allocate weight to the evidence presented by the parties 
as a justification for admitting potential hearsay evidence or even evidence claimed to be 
“forged or stolen or otherwise inauthentic or tainted.”57 In addition, the relevance of 
evidence is often unknown until the parties have presented all their evidence, resulting in 
the arbitrators favoring admissibility over exclusion.58 The hearing will typically involve 
testimony from fact witnesses,  expert witnesses, or both.59 Typically, in international 
arbitration the witnesses will testify through written statements, rather than oral 
testimony.60 
                                                
50 Id. at 19. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 20. 
54 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 20. 
55 Id. at 20-21 Despite the arbitrators’ lack of subpoena power, parties generally produce whatever 
documents they are ordered to produce. Id. By contrast, under U.S. federal law, arbitrators do have 
subpoena power. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2016); see also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 91-
92 (3d ed. 2012). 
56 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 21. 
57 Id. at 22. 
58 Id. at 23. 
59 Id. at 26. Fact witnesses “are expected to provide facts, not to set out arguments about what those facts 
mean. Arbitrators, as a rule, do not take kindly to witnesses who try to plead the case of the party that called 
them.” Id. By contract, expert witnesses “do not testify about the facts of the dispute but rather about the 
significance, in the expert’s field of expertise, of facts the expert deems relevant to the dispute.” Id. 
60 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 26-27. Written statements will usually be prepared by counsel and 
allow the arbitration to proceed more efficiently because the statements will alleviate the need for much, if 
any, oral testimony, which is often limited to cross-examination. The arbitrators, in addition to counsel, may 
ask questions of the witnesses. Id. 
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C.  The Role of Cross-Examination in International Arbitration 
In an arbitration, the arbitrators serve as both judge and jury.61 More importantly, 
unlike domestic trials, the arbitrators may be from different nations among themselves 
and among counsel, adding a multicultural aspect not as common outside of international 
arbitration.62 The multiculturalism introduces not only the possibility of arbitrators who 
speak different languages natively, but also arbitrators who come from different legal 
traditions.63 Counsel must ensure that the cross-examination is “succinct and efficient” 
because the arbitrators will likely come from varied backgrounds, have significant 
experience, and will probably be accomplished lawyers in their own right.64 
The authors identified nine principles, fully discussed below, to effective cross-
examination that seek that “succinct and efficient” goal. The authors describe the 
rationale of cross-examination as reducing “to the extent reasonably possible, the adverse 
impact of the witness’s direct testimony on your client’s case.”65 With this purpose in 
mind, counsel should consider whether to cross-examine, whether the direct testimony 
was sufficiently damaging, and whether cross-examination is likely to mend the damage 
without making it worse.66 The nine principles discussed below will guide the attorney in 
making that decision and, if he chooses to cross-examine, in conducting a succinct, 
effective cross-examination.  
IV.   PART II – THE NINE BASIC PRINCIPLES 
A.  Basic Principle One: Be Fully Prepared 
Good cross-examination begins with a well-prepared attorney.67 The authors 
define full preparation as having a thorough knowledge of the facts, a mastery of the law, 
                                                
61 Id. at 29. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 30. The authors also note: 
The absence of national rules of evidence also means that some conduct which is customary, or even 
obligatory, under some national systems has no place in international arbitration. As an example, the 
practice of ‘putting’ a contention to a witness need not be used in international arbitrations, and its use can 
often be counter-productive because one or more of the arbitrators may find it uncongenial or offensive or 
time-wasting. 
Id. 
64 Id. at 31. 
65 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 32. 
66 Id. at 33. 
67 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 49. 
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and a plan for each witness the attorney intends to question.68 Good preparation, though, 
goes back further to the attorney’s theory of his client’s case.69 The authors write that the 
attorney’s theory of the case should direct everything the attorney does during the 
arbitration.70 Practically, the authors recommend drafting a closing argument early and 
“working backwards” to figure out how to achieve the objective of persuading the 
arbitrators to accept the attorney’s theory of the case.71 An attorney should only proceed 
with cross-examination if it is necessary to support the attorney’s theory of the case.72 
Keeping in mind the role of cross-examination as a tool to elicit the framework of the 
theory of the case and the risks involved in questioning the witness, the authors state, “the 
first rule of cross-examination: Don’t.”73 If the attorney can glean the same evidentiary 
support from other methods, such as exhibits to written witness statements, then the 
attorney should avoid cross-examination.74 
If the attorney decides to cross-examine the witness, the attorney must consider 
each witness as just “one piece of the jigsaw puzzle,” ask the right questions, and only 
ask as many questions as are necessary to achieve the attorney’s objective for that 
witness.75 The general rule for asking the right question is to know the answer before 
asking the question.76 The authors also suggest deciding on a safe final question for the 
witness, then a safe initial question, which provides the attorney with a framework for the 
cross-examination.77 The sequence of the middle questions can follow a chronological 
timeline, but the authors believe that the chronological approach is a mistake in 
commercial disputes, which occupies most of international arbitration.78 The parties will 
                                                
68 Id. at 49-50. 
69 Id. at 50. Hobér illustrates this principle with the “successful gambit” of defense attorney Johnny 
Cochran in his representation of O.J. Simpson: “‘If the glove don’t fit you must acquit.’ The glove referred 
to was a blood-soaked glove that was found at the murder scene but was too small for Simpson’s hand and 
thus showed his non-involvement – which was the defence’s [sic] theory of the case.” Id. 
70 Id. (stating that the closing argument is the best time to convince the arbitrators of the attorney’s theory 
of the case). 
71 Id. at 50-51 (stating that a closing argument should do three things: explain the theory of the case, 
persuade the arbitrators toward the attorney’s theory, and dissuade the arbitrators from siding with the 
opponent’s theory). 
72 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 51. 
73 Id. at 52. 
74 Id. at 51. 
75 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 53. 
76 Id. at 55 (stating two rationales for the general rule: (1) “an unexpected answer may well destroy your 
plan for the cross-examination” and (2) “cross-examination is not the place to find out further facts about 
the case”). 
77 Id. at 55. 
78 Id. at 60. 
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have already covered the chronology of events in their written statements, making this 
approach redundant and a waste of time.79 Instead, the authors recommend a thematic 
approach and organizing questions logically within each theme.80 The authors also 
suggest a “decision tree,” which identifies alternative answers to each question and 
prepares follow-up questions.81 
B.  Basic Principle Two: Be Brief 
In keeping with the idea that each witness is only a piece to a larger jigsaw 
puzzle, the authors recommend making a maximum of three main points per cross-
examination.82 The main points to make depend on the attorney’s theory of the case.83 
The authors suggest four reasons for keeping cross-examinations short: 
[T]he longer the time you spend on cross-examination, the greater 
the risk that things will go wrong – that is, that the witness will say 
things that will hurt your client’s case. A second reason is that a 
brief, succinct, and focused cross-examination has a much better 
chance of persuading the arbitrators of the point or points you are 
trying to make. A third reason is that in international arbitration the 
arbitrators are usually quite familiar with the relevant facts of the 
dispute. This means that there is a serious risk that the arbitrators 
will lose interest in a cross-examination which is unfocused and 
long-winded. Yet a fourth reason is the risk that the arbitrators will 
think you are wasting their time, and as a result will not only lose 
interest but also become irritated at you, which will disadvantage 
your client.84 
The authors reiterate here that attorneys should only cross-examine a witness if they need 
to and should not allow their clients to push additional questioning.85 
                                                
79 Id. 
80 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 60. 
81 Id. at 64 (stating, for example, “if the initial inquiry is ‘You did not sign the contract, did you?’, there 
would be four main branches for each of ‘no,’ ‘do not recall signing,’ ‘not sure,’ and ‘yes I did,’ with 
subsidiary branches descending from those main branches”). See also DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES 
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL § 12-22 (5th ed. 2014) (suggesting a chart of subjects with 
introductory questions for each section). 
82 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 66. 
83 Id. 
84 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 67. 
85 Id. at 70. 
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 With respect to experts, attorneys must be careful in cross-examination not to 
attack the expert witness on the expert’s field of expertise because the attorneys, in most 
cases, will not have sufficient knowledge to do so effectively, even with the education 
provided by the attorneys’ own experts.86 Instead, the authors suggest several lines of 
questioning: (1) the expert’s qualification to provide an opinion, (2) the factual basis 
informing the expert’s opinion and whether additional or different facts would change the 
expert’s testimony, (3) the intellectual basis of the expert’s opinion, (4) whether the 
expert’s testimony is consistent with the standards or opinions of other experts in the 
same or a similar field, and (5) personal characteristics that call the expert’s credibility 
into question.87 
C.  Basic Principle Three: Use Only Leading Questions 
A leading question “expressly or implicitly suggests the answer sought.”88 
Leading questions make sense in the context of cross-examination because leading 
questions do not elicit new information, which comports with the goal that the attorney 
will rarely use cross-examination to acquire new facts. Instead, leading questions ask a 
witness to agree or disagree with what the authors describe as a “short, simple, 
unambiguous statement of a single, simple fact.”89 The authors caution that the attorney 
needs to be fully prepared and know what the witness’s truthful answer will be.90 In 
practice, a proper leading question will evoke either a yes or no answer and not 
encourage the witness to expound on his or her own narrative.91 
D.  Basic Principle Four: Use Only Short, Simple, Unambiguous Questions 
In addition to brevity, discussed in Subsection B above, a good cross-examination 
will be simple.92 Clear, short, and simple questions will enable the attorney to exercise 
                                                
86 Id. at 72-73 (although the expert witness section appears in the “be brief” chapter, the content of the 
section bears little relevance to brevity and, in fact, includes a lengthy cross-examination excerpt as an 
illustration). 
87 Id. at 73. 
88 Id. at 78. 
89 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 79. 
90 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 79. 
91 Id. The authors naturally talk about the need to keep witnesses to yes or no answers that prevent 
witnesses from telling stories. Id. That is also the basic thrust of Principle No. 4, using short, simple, 
unambiguous questions. The two principles seem, to me, sufficiently related, and instead they could be one 
cohesive principle. In fact, they seem more like two parts of an overall principle regarding the form of the 
questions an attorney should ask. Teasing them out into two separate principles seems unnecessary to me 
and adds to the feeling of redundancy throughout the book. 
92 Id. at 87. 
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better control over the witness and will make it more difficult for the witness to answer 
evasively.93 The authors offer as a rule of thumb that a question should be, at most, 
twenty-five words and should address only a single fact.94 
Lack of simplicity creates a myriad of potential problems during cross-
examination: 
The witness may not understand the question and may ask you to 
repeat it. The witness may take part of the question and use it to 
launch into a speech about something you don’t want to hear or 
have the arbitrators hear. The witness may try to draw you into a 
debate about the meaning of your question. Any of these things 
may cause you to lose control of the witness and of the cross-
examination. If the witness uses the poorly worded question as a 
platform from which to launch into a speech, even worse things 
may happen.95 
Accordingly, the authors advise against compound questions that pile question upon 
question and suggest sticking to simple, single-fact questions that are easy to 
understand.96 Simplicity also means stripping questions of unnecessary words, such as 
adjectives or imprecise language.97 
E.  Basic Principle Five: Listen to the Answer 
Effective cross-examination is not just asking the right questions in the right way 
but also carefully listening to the witness’s answer and understanding “the meaning and 
significance of what the witness says.”98 Close listening serves two purposes: (1) 
ensuring that the witness actually answered the question and (2) determining if the 
answer requires a change of course in the direction of the cross-examination.99  
                                                
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 87-88. The authors also recommend using the witness’s surname to “remind the witness that the 
arbitrators are focused on the witness as an individual with a reputation and position to protect and are not 
just engaged in an abstract intellectual enterprise.” Id. See also Gary S. Gildin, Cross-Examination at Trial: 
Strategies for the Deposition, 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 471, 494 (2012): “Asking a leading question alone 
will not prevent the witness from launching a narrative that revisits the direct examination. During cross-
examination, counsel must abide by a second tenet regarding the form of the question – each leading 
question should pose only one additional fact to be admitted or denied.” 
95 Hobér & Sussman, supra note 1, at 89. 
96 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 91. 
97 Id. (stating, as an example, a comparison between “[Question]: The ring cost $50,000, didn’t it?” and 
“[Question]: The ring was very expensive, wasn’t it?”). 
98 Id. at 104. 
99 Id. at 104. 
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The authors identify four categories of answers: (1) a simple “yes,” (2) something 
more than a “yes,” (3) an honest witness who does not answer, and (4) a “witness with an 
agenda” who fails to answer.100 The first category, while seeming to be exactly what the 
attorney would want, still demands a close ear because the manner in which the witness 
gave the simple “yes” answer can be revealing.101 The second category triggers the same 
analysis as the first category.102  
The “failure to answer” categories lead to an even more complex analysis of the 
witness and his or her motivations. As the authors point out, “Your understanding of why 
the witness did not answer will also provide some idea of what dangers may be 
encountered as the examination proceeds.”103 If the attorney thinks that the witness was 
being honest but just did not answer the question, then the answer would fall into the 
third category. In that case, the witness “will usually work with you to get an answer to 
the question and so you could proceed on the assumption that the witness is willing to do 
that.”104 A good test is to restate the question. If the witness answers it properly, then the 
attorney’s impression was accurate; however, if the witness still fails to answer the 
question, then the attorney can be “reasonably confident … that the witness is not willing 
to be cooperative, and that the approach to the witness should therefore be changed.”105 
An evasive, uncooperative witness, giving an answer falling into category four, can still 
support the overarching aim of the cross-examiner, though, because the arbitrators will 
observe the repeated evasions and may use that as a basis for discrediting the witness.106 
F.  Basic Principle Six: Do Not Ask for Conclusions 
Ultimately, the attorney wants the arbitrators to draw inferences from the cross-
examination, which the attorney will reiterate and argue in closing arguments; however, 
during cross-examination, the attorney must be careful not to ask the witness to agree 
with those inferences or conclusions.107 The purpose of cross-examination, as stated 
above, is to “diminish the adverse impact of the witness’s testimony on your client’s 
                                                
100 Id. at 107-09. 
101 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 107. The attorney must consider, “Did the witness seem 
cooperative in giving the answer? Did the witness seem unsure or hesitant before answering, or hostile or 
combative? What did the witness’s tone of voice and facial expression and hand movement or movements 
suggest, and did any of them change from the witness’s previous answers?” Id. 
102 Id. (stating, “…why did the witness say more than was necessary to answer the question? What did that 
‘more’ contain, and can it be used to benefit your client’s case?”). 
103 Id. at 108. 
104 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 108. 
105 Id. at 109. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 115. 
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case,” not to make an argument.108 Veering away from facts and toward conclusions 
encourages the witness to narrate more and may result in testimony that does not progress 
the attorney’s objective.109 
The authors acknowledge that the temptation to ask for a conclusion can be 
overwhelming and difficult to avoid, especially when the witness agrees with a series of 
facts put forward by the attorney.110 As a practical example, the authors describe a 
scenario where the witness admits he wrote certain documents, “signed them, had read 
them before signing them, and understood and agreed with their contents.”111 None of 
that, however, guarantees that the witness and the attorney will agree about what the 
documents mean, which would call for a conclusion.112 
Asking for a conclusion usually falls under the umbrella of asking “one question 
too many.”113 The above example illustrates this principal, as the cross-examiner likely 
had an effective series of questions by getting the witness to admit to writing, reading, 
and signing the document. Asking for a conclusion is unnecessary and goes one question 
too far. The authors suggest that knowing when to stop begins with knowing what the 
attorney wants to achieve in the cross-examination – the final question that was prepared 
ahead of time – and stopping when the attorney has “scored a significant ‘hit.’”114 
G.  Basic Principle Seven: Do Not Let the Witness Repeat the Direct Testimony 
Given the basic premise that cross-examination attempts to neutralize damaging 
portions of a witness’s direct testimony, it logically follows that a cross-examiner should 
not allow a witness to repeat direct testimony unless the attorney determines that it will 
advantage his or her client.115 The authors suggest that the most effect way to minimize 
the risk of a witness repeating his or her direct testimony is to use “short, simple, 
unambiguous leading questions limited to a single, simple fact [that] will call for simple 
                                                
108 Id. at 115. 
109 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 116. 
110 Id. at 117. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 118 (as happens elsewhere in the book, the “one question too 
many” subsection is not strictly related the rest of the chapter, but may not have a logical home elsewhere). 
See also Gildin, supra note 94, at 496-97: “As a general rule, the cross-examiner will not ask the witness to 
admit a subjective conclusion. Rather, the cross-examiner will ask the witness to admit only a series of 
objective facts. Taken collectively, and in the order they are presented, the admitted facts will scream the 
subjective conclusion to the trier of fact. However, the cross-examiner never asks the witness what Irving 
Younger immortalized as the ‘one question too many’ – the conclusion that follows from the just-admitted 
facts.” Id. 
114 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 123. 
115 Id. at 126. 
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answers and will tend to limit the witness’s ability to repeat things from the direct 
testimony.”116 The authors acknowledge, however, that repetitions may happen and, in 
such a case, recommend ignoring the repeated testimony and continuing with the line of 
questions.117 
The most common occasion when an attorney may want the witness to repeat 
direct testimony is when the witness makes a statement that is inconsistent with a prior 
statement made by the witness.118 The authors note that surprising a witness with an 
inconsistent statement rarely happens in international arbitration, but understanding how 
to handle such a situation is worth exploring.119 For an inconsistency to be useful on 
cross-examination, it must make a discernible difference to the issues before the 
arbitrators, and it must be something that the witness will not be able to explain.120 An 
effective cross-examiner can use an inconsistent statement for two possible purposes: to 
attack and destroy the witness’s credibility or to imply that the arbitrators should take the 
prior inconsistent statement, and not the direct testimony, as the truth.121 
H.  Basic Principle Eight: Do Not Let the Witness Explain 
The cross-examining attorney must maintain control of the witness at all times, 
which includes preventing the witness from explaining answers or asking questions.122 In 
some instances, a witness will attempt to explain an answer because the question is 
defective and cannot be answered with simply “yes” or “no,” but in other instances, the 
witness will likely have an agenda.123 When the attorney thinks the witness may have an 
agenda, an effective technique is to ask the witness, “Did you understand my 
question?”124 If the witness answers affirmatively, the attorney can ask why the witness 
did not answer the question; if the witness responds that he or she did not understand the 
                                                
116 Id. at 127. 
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119 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 129. 
120 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 130-31. A statement repeated from direct testimony should relate 
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question, the attorney can ask a series of questions to achieve the same result, being 
careful to avoid the supposedly incomprehensible question.125 
Ultimately, the authors state that the attorney will not stop a witness from making 
a speech if the witness is determined to do so.126 When a witness makes a speech, the 
attorney has some options: (1) the attorney can simply ignore the speech, (2) the attorney 
can use the speech as a springboard for further questions that will help the client’s case, 
or (3) the attorney can repeat the question and ask the witness to answer it again.127 The 
authors caution against inciting further speeches by attempting to reformulate the speech 
in the attorney’s words.128 
I.   Basic Principle Nine: Exercise Self-control – Do Not Argue, or Get Angry, 
with the Witness129 
The best cross-examiners will not only maintain control of the witness, but will 
practice self-control as well.130 When the lawyer loses his or her composure, the witness 
gains freedom to say whatever he or she wants.131 In addition, the arbitrators will see the 
lawyer’s loss of control, which damages the attorney’s persuasiveness.132 Cross-
examiners must always be careful not to argue with the witness or get angry with the 
witness.133 The lawyer must “be perceived as trustworthy and credible if [he is] to do as 
                                                
125 HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 139-40. 
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127 Id. at 142-43. 
128 Id. at 144. 
129 To some extent, the nine principles build on each other, starting with the need for thorough preparation, 
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good a job as you can for [his] client, and these behaviors contribute to – may even be 
essential for – [his] being perceived that way.”134 
V.   PART IV – CONCLUSION 
Cross-examination in International Arbitration focuses on the practical building 
blocks of effective cross-examination. Although the authors contextualize their principles 
in the setting of international arbitration, the principles are equally valid in domestic 
arbitration and even trial courts. The authors provide concrete advice and amply illustrate 
their principles with both real and hypothetical cross-examination exchanges. The authors 
effectively fleshed out their nine basic principles, including: (1) being fully prepared; (2) 
being brief; (3) using only leading questions; (4) using short, simple, and clear questions; 
(5) listening to the answer; (6) not asking for conclusions; (7) keeping the witness from 
repeating direct testimony; (8) preventing the witness from explaining answers; and (9) 
maintaining self-control. 
As noted above, the authors, at times, included sub-sections within certain 
chapters that did not seem to fit, which can make the book seem cobbled together. 
However, the book has an overall feel of a collection of proverbs, which makes the 
misplaced sub-sections tolerable, despite the authors’ intent to organize it into basic 
principles. I found it more bothersome that the authors chose to tease out their advice into 
nine principles, where they probably could have collapsed some into a single principle. 
For instance, I did not think the authors needed to break apart the type of questions into 
two principles: leading questions and short and simple questions. However, again, that 
was only a minor issue and not something that impaired my ability, as a reader, to gain 
important and useful knowledge. 
I also found it strange and disconnecting that some of the sample cross-
examinations failed to fully illustrate the advice the authors were giving. In some 
instances, the authors even acknowledge that the illustration demonstrated one principle 
but violated others. Perhaps this, itself, is a useful lesson: that no cross-examination will 
be perfect but can still be effective. However, as a reader, I wanted the illustrations to 
give me a glimpse of how to do what the authors suggest I do, and when they fail to 
capture all but one or two principles, I am left wondering what a fully realized cross-
examination looks like. 
Beyond cross-examination, the book also provides an excellent framework for 
good lawyering, plain and simple. Principles such as being fully prepared, carefully 
listening to what the witness says, and maintaining self-control all extend outside the 
context of a cross-examination. A good lawyer will be prepared, will listen to his or her 
clients and adversaries, and will practice self-control and civility in a multitude of 
situations. With that in mind, the book becomes even more useful than the authors 
apparently intended, especially for law students and new lawyers. Even with the flaws I 
mentioned above, the book offers a treasure trove of excellent advice, all in a quick and 
easy read. I fully recommend this book for both law students, young attorneys, or even 
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seasoned attorneys who want to freshen up their skills in the courtroom or arbitration 
proceeding.
